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ABSTRACT 
 
Influenza A viruses are highly infectious respiratory pathogens that can infect many species. Birds are the 
reservoir for all known influenza A subtypes; and novel influenza viruses can emerge from birds and infect 
mammalian species including humans. Because swine are susceptible to infection with both avian and human 
influenza  viruses,  novel  reassortant  influenza  viruses  can  be  generated  in  this  mammalian  species  by 
reassortment of influenza viral segments leading to the “mixing vessel” theory. There is no direct evidence 
that the reassortment events culminating in the 1918, 1957 or 1968 pandemic influenza viruses originated 
from  pigs.  Genetic  reassortment  among  avian,  human  and/or  swine  influenza  virus  gene  segments  has 
occurred in pigs and some novel reassortant swine viruses have been transmitted to humans. Notably, novel 
reassortant H2N3 influenza viruses isolated from the US pigs, most likely infected with avian influenza 
viruses through surface water collected in ponds for cleaning barns and watering animals, had a similar 
genetic make-up to early isolates (1957) of the H2N2 human pandemic. These novel H2N3 swine viruses 
were able to cause disease in swine and mice and were infectious and highly transmissible in swine and 
ferrets without prior adaptation. The preceding example shows that pigs could transmit novel viruses from an 
avian reservoir to other mammalian species.  Importantly, H2 viruses pose a substantial risk to humans 
because they have been absent from mammalian species since 1968 and people born after 1968 have little 
preexisting immunity to the H2 subtype. It is difficult to predict which virus will cause the next human 
pandemic and when that pandemic might begin. Importantly, the establishment and spread of a reassorted 
mammalian-adapted virus from pigs to humans could happen anywhere in the world. Therefore, both human 
and  veterinary  research  needs  to  give  more attention to  potential  cross-species  transmission  capacity of 
influenza A viruses.      
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INTRODUCTION 
 
The ecology of influenza A viruses 
The presence of all subtypes influenza A viruses in wild 
aquatic birds poses serious health risks to a wide range of 
animal species.  Influenza A viruses are enveloped, single-, 
negative-stranded and segmented RNA viruses belonging 
to the Orthomyxoviridae family; they are highly infectious 
respiratory pathogens in their respective natural hosts. All 
16 known hemagglutinin (HA) and 9 neuraminidase (NA) 
subtypes of influenza A viruses have been isolated from 
wild  waterfowl  and  seabirds  (Webster  et  al,  2006). 
Although some of these subtypes are non-pathogenic/non-
virulent within their natural hosts and have been present in 
these  animal  reservoirs  for  many  centuries,  various 
subtypes  are  highly  virulent  within  their  natural  host  
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species  and  to  other  species  (Webby  et  al,  2007).  For 
example, the changing role of the highly pathogenic avian 
influenza virus (HPAIV) H5N1 subtype in both wild and 
domestic  ducks  has  recently  been  documented  as  a 
potential  public  health  hazard  because  they  are  zoonotic 
agents with the theoretical ability – after genetic adaptation 
–  of  a  human-to-human  transmission,  i.e.,  the  start  of  a 
human epidemic/pandemic (Hulse-Post et al, 2005). 
 
The ecology of influenza A viruses is dynamic and complex 
involving  multiple  host  species  and  viral  genes.  
Commercial poultry farms, “wet markets,” (where live birds 
and  other  animals  are  sold),  backyard  poultry  farms, 
commercial and family poultry slaughtering facilities, swine 
farms, human dietary habits and the global trade in exotic 
animals have all been implicated in the spread of influenza 
A viruses (Greger, 2006). The “wet markets” of Southeast 
Asia, where people, pigs, ducks, geese and chickens (and 
occasionally other animals) are in close proximity pose a 
particular  danger  to  public  health  (Webster,  2004;  Bush, 
2005; Greenfeld, 2006; Lau et al, 2007).  
 
Scientific  opinion  differs  on  the  probability  of  future 
sustained  human-to-human  transmission,  e.g.,  for  H5N1 
HPAIV,  as  well  as  on  which  viruses  pose  the  greatest 
threat to humanity and to other species (Hilleman, 2002). 
The prevailing scientific view regarding a possible H5N1 
epidemic is that sustained human-to-human transmission 
will  occur  at  some  unknown  future  date  and  that  a 
prediction  on  the  future  virulence  of  H5N1  viruses  to 
humans is very difficult to make. The H5N1 HPAIVs are 
possibly the greatest threat at the moment, although H1, 
H2, H3, H7 and H9 avian-derived viruses are also strong 
contenders  as  causes  of  potential  epidemics  in  various 
species,  including  humans  (Hilleman,  2002;  Wan  et  al, 
2008). This review will conclude that an avian influenza 
virus transmitted  via pigs to humans poses a significant 
risk to cause a new influenza pandemic, possibly on the 
disturbing  scale  of  the  human  influenza  pandemic 
experienced  during  1918-1920  (H1N1  “Spanish  Flu”). 
Before investigating the role of swine in the influenza A 
viruses,  it  is  necessary  to  consider  the  challenge  which 
influenza A viruses pose to both human and animal health. 
 
INFLUENZA AND HUMAN HEALTH 
 
The history of human influenza pandemics offers important 
information for future events. A human influenza pandemic 
in 1580 that impacted Europe, Asia and Africa, significant 
regional  epidemics  in  the  17
th  century  and  further 
epidemics and pandemics in the 18
th (1729-30, 1732-33, 
and 1781-82), 19
th (1830-31, 1833 and 1889-90) and 20
th 
(1918,  1957,  1968)  centuries  have  been  documented 
(Crosby,  1993;  Lina,  2008;  Quinn,  2008).  Thus  the 
pandemic  flu  occurring  in  1918-20  caused  by  an  H1N1 
subtype  virus  (Tumpey  et  al,  2005)  was  not  surprising, 
even if the precise source, timing and virulence could not 
be predicted. What has been surprising is that the human 
influenza  pandemic  of  1957-1958  (H2N2  “Asian  Flu”), 
1968  (H3N2  “Hong  Kong  Flu”),  the  1976  H1N1  swine 
influenza outbreak in Fort Dix, NJ, the reintroduction of 
H1N1 in 1977 from Russia and the 1997 outbreak of the 
newly emerging H5N1 HPAIV in commercial poultry and 
humans in Hong Kong have all been less virulent in terms 
of their morbidity and their mortality (de Jong et al, 2000; 
Horimoto and Kawaoka, 2005). 
 
These  rather  mild  influenza  pandemics/epidemics  in  the 
20
th and 21
st century raise several significant questions:  (i) 
Have  influenza  A  viruses  become  less  virulent  for 
humans? (ii) Has modern medicine become more able to 
control these outbreaks than in earlier centuries?  There is 
reasonable  evidence  suggesting  that  influenza  A  viruses 
are not becoming less virulent, nor has modern medicine 
been able to prevent either the beginning of a pandemic 
nor its immediate spread (Morse, 2007; Korteweg and Gu, 
2008; Wu et al, 2008). While there is now considerable 
understanding  of  how  viruses  cause  influenza,  much 
research and development still needs to be done before the 
quantity,  timeliness  and  effectiveness  of  both  antiviral 
compounds and prophylactic vaccines can be provided “in 
time”  in  order  to  protect  the  public  from  a  devastating 
future influenza pandemic (Yamada et al, 2008; Yang et 
al,  2008;  Cheung,  2008).  Nevertheless,  the  recent 
development  of  prepandemic  influenza  vaccines  for  the 
vaccination of individuals and communities is encouraging 
(Jennings et al, 2008). 
 
According  to  the  World  Health  Organization  (WHO), 
since  2003  of  the  387  confirmed  human  cases  with 
confirmed  H5N1  HPAIV  infection,  63%  (245  persons) 
have died (WHO, 2008a).  It should be noted that 90% of 
H5N1 cases (348) and 91% of H5N1-related deaths (223) 
have  been  in  only  five  countries:  Indonesia,  Vietnam, 
Egypt,  Thailand  and  China.  These  data  support  the 
prediction  of  the  Lowy  Institute  in  Australia  that  if  an 
influenza pandemic does occur, 95% of deaths will be in 
developing  countries  (McKibbon  and  Sidorenko,  2006). 
Nevertheless, since 2005, the WHO Pandemic Alert Level 
dealing with the H5N1 HPAIV epidemic has remained at 
Phase 3: “Human infection(s) with a new subtype, but no 
human-to-human  spread,  or  at  more  rare  instances  of 
spread to a close contact” (WHO, 2005).   
 
Human-to-human  transmissions  of  HPAIV  H5N1  have 
been  found  within  individual  families  in  Thailand, 
Indonesia  and  most  probably  China  (Ungchusak  et  al, 
2005; Normile, 2007; MacKenzie, 2008).  The epidemic 
situation in these countries has come close to a Phase 4 
Pandemic Alert: “Small cluster(s) with limited human-to-
human  transmission  but  spread  is  highly  localized, 
suggesting that the virus is not well adapted to humans” 
(WHO, 2005). However, because the virus has remained 
localized within these families, the WHO has not raised 
the alert level. If a Phase 4 Alert level were to be reached, 
it is not clear whether the small clusters of infected people 
could  be  contained  locally.  WHO  as  well  as  various 
international  nongovernmental  organizations  (NGOs), 
including  InSTEDD  (www.instedd.org),  PATH  (the  Bill 
and  Melinda  Gates  Foundation-sponsored  Program  for 
Appropriate  Technology  in  Health)  (www.path.org/news 
/pr080114_flu_research.php), Global Health and Security 
Initiative  (www.ghsi.org)  and  Google.org 
(www.google.org)  (Yamada  et  al,  2008),  are  trying  to 
prevent a Phase 5 Pandemic Alert (i.e., with a “substantial 
pandemic  risk”)  in  which  “human-to-human  spread”  is  
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still  localized  while  the  virus  is  becoming  increasingly 
better  adapted  to  humans,  but  may  not  be  fully 
transmissible” (WHO, 2005). A Phase 6 situation of a full 
pandemic  is  defined  as  “an  increased  and  sustained 
transmission in the general population” and would threaten 
up  to  half  of  the world’s  population.  Although  a future 
influenza  pandemic  would  spread  from  community  to 
community, the seriousness  of the illness would depend 
upon  the  virulence  of  the  virus  (Editorial,  The  Lancet, 
2006). The assumption  that the presently observed 63% 
mortality rate for H5N1 HPAIV in humans (as estimated 
by WHO-confirmed cases) will significantly reduce as the 
virus  spreads  within  the  human  population  is  not 
substantiated (Bergstrom, 2008; Bull and Ebert, 2008). For 
example, the H5N1 HPAIVs might or might not acquire 
the ability to transmit efficiently from human to human.  
Importantly, H5N1 HPAIVs have reached high prevalence 
in domestic and wild birds in many parts of Asia and have 
spread  to  Europe  and  Africa  (Mills  et  al,  2006;  WHO, 
2008b). 
 
LINKING HUMAN  AND  ANIMAL HEALTH:  THE 
CHALLENGE OF ZOONOTIC INFECTIONS 
 
Influenza  is  only  one  of  the  more  than  200  infectious 
diseases  transmitted  between  humans  and  animals 
(McMichael, 2005; Childs et al, 2007; Ellis, 2008). Given 
the 30% increase of newly emerging zoonotic diseases in 
the final third of the twentieth century, it may well be that 
HIV/AIDS, Ebola/Marburg/Zaire  virus,  West  Nile  virus, 
Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome virus or some other 
new pathogens will pose a greater threat than influenza to 
either the  human  or animal  kingdoms (Greenfeld,  2006; 
Ellis, 2008). Yet the presence of a high prevalence avian 
reservoir for influenza indicates that the threat of influenza 
is significant, and that human and animal health must be 
viewed as an integrated network (Gibbs, 2005; Martinot et 
al,  2007;  Childs  et  al,  2007).  This  is  critical  as  public 
health and veterinary science is moving towards the “one 
world, one health” concept (Enserink, 2007). 
 
Avian influenza infections of commercial poultry already 
represent the largest incidence of an animal disease ever 
recorded, with several hundred million wild birds, geese, 
chickens, turkeys and ducks having died from the virus or 
been  culled  as  part  of  the  HPAIV  control  program  
(McKenzie,  2006).  Furthermore,  HPAIVs  will  remain 
endemic in wild birds in Asia and other parts of the world, 
whatever  attempts  are  made  by  the  authorities  in  these 
regions of the world to mitigate them. What is in question 
is the extent to which HPAIV will spread to humans and if 
so, how lethal it will be.  
 
To date, the major attention has focused on the capacity of 
H5N1 HPAIVs to infect and kill humans.  In investigating 
the January 2004 H5N1 outbreak in Vietnam, Hien et al. 
(2004) noted that only humans with very close contact to 
infected poultry died.  In addition, it has been suggested 
that those people who become infected with H5N1 had an 
immune constitution particularly susceptible to the H5N1 
virus (Albright et al, 2008). Such a hypothesis is based on 
evidence that only a few of the people reporting extensive 
exposure to H5N1-diseased chickens actually become ill.  
In contrast, Pitzer and his colleagues (2007) could not find 
any  evidence  of  human  genetic  susceptibility  to  H5N1 
viruses. The crucial issue is  whether a human influenza 
virus and an avian or animal (e.g., swine) influenza virus 
might reassort to create a novel reassortant virus with the 
capability  of  sustained  human-to-human  transmission.  It 
appears  unlikely  that  the  wild  bird/domestic  duck/ 
chicken/human  link  in  itself  will  soon  create  a  new 
pandemic because after 11 years of an ongoing epidemic 
transmission  (starting  with  1997  Hong  Kong  outbreak), 
only limited human-to-human transmission has occurred.   
It  could  take  decades  before  the  “correct,  i.e.,  human-
adapted” mutations occur in the H5N1 influenza viruses 
(Normile, 2006; Shinya et al, 2006; van Riel et al, 2006).  
Swine might play a critical role as a “mixing vessel” in 
this evolutionary process. 
 
THE  ROLE  OF  SWINE  IN  THE  TRANSMISSION 
OF INFLUENZA A VIRUSES 
 
Because swine are susceptible to infection with both avian 
and  human  influenza  viruses,  genetic  reassortment 
between  human  and  avian  influenza  viruses  can  occur 
when  these  viruses  co-infect  an  individual  pig 
(Scholtissek,  1990).  The  double  (avian/human; 
human/swine) and triple (human/avian/swine) reassortant 
influenza A viruses isolated from pigs in the United States 
or  China  provide  supportive  evidence  for  the  “mixing 
vessel” theory.  As early as 1919, Koen, an inspector with 
the U.S. Bureau of Animal Industry, was pointing out that 
influenza outbreaks began with either pigs or people, but 
were then rapidly transferred to each other (1919).  In an 
extensive  review  of  avian  influenza,  Greger  (2006) 
commented: “It was never clear, though, whether the pigs 
were the culprits or the victims.  Did we infect the pigs or 
did they infect us”.  It seems that both species are able to 
infect each other easily (Schultz et al, 1991).   
 
In  contrast,  Taubenberger  and  his  colleagues  (2005), 
after analyzing the complete genome of the 1918 Spanish 
flu  virus,  proposed  that  “the  1918  virus  was  not  a 
reassortant  virus  (like  those  of  the  1957  and  1968 
pandemics), but more likely an entirely avian-like virus 
which crossed the species barrier to humans without an 
intermediate  mammal  and  infected  and  adapted  to 
humans.” This conclusion has been challenged by Gibbs 
and  Gibbs  (2006)  and  Antonovics  et  al.  (2006)  who 
believe  that  Taubenberger’s  results  suggest  that  “the 
virus began in mammals before the pandemic began and 
that it was a reassortant.” Which kind of mammal acted 
as an intermediary  to create the  1918 virus is still not 
completely understood. Subsequently, Taubenberger et al 
(2006) acknowledge that phylogenetic analysis alone is 
not sufficient to answer the question of the origin of the 
1918  virus, as the avian-like virus could  have infected 
either  an  unknown  mammal  or  the  human  population 
several  years  before  the  1918  pandemic  began.  They 
believe  that  adaptation  of  the  virus  occurred  within  a 
human source.       
 
As  previously  noted,  the  viruses  that  caused  the  1957 
Asian  and  1968  Hong  Kong  influenza  pandemics  are 
reassortant  viruses  of  human  and  avian  origin  viruses  
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(Kawaoka et al, 1989). However, to date no one knows 
exactly how these viruses were generated. There are two 
major  reassortant  hypotheses:  1)The  AIV  transmits  to 
humans  first  and  then  reassorts  with  human  influenza 
viruses;  2)  Both the  avian  and human influenza  viruses 
infect and reassort in an unknown mammal, for example 
pigs;  then  the  novel  reassortant  virus  is  transmitted  to 
humans (Ito et al, 1998).  
 
The  obvious  potential  of  creating  novel  reassortant 
influenza  viruses in pigs has led to the “mixing  vessel” 
theory  (Figure  1).  The  theory  was  first  proposed  by 
Scholtissek  and  his  colleagues  (1985)  based  on  the 
understanding  that  human  influenza  A  viruses  do  not 
spread easily to birds and vice versa, whereas the species 
barrier to pigs is rather low (Scholtissek, 1990; 1996).  The 
antigenic and genetic similarities between certain subtypes 
of  avian,  swine  and  human  influenza  viruses  and  the 
susceptibility  of  swine  to  avian  and  human  influenza 
viruses  form  the  basis  of  this  theory.  Most  avian  and 
human  influenza  viruses  preferentially  bind  to  specific 
receptor  types  having  SAα2,3Gal  (avian  receptor)-  or 
SAα2,6Gal (mammalian receptor)-terminated saccharides, 
respectively  (Rogers  and  Paulson,  1983;  Rogers  and 
D’Souza,  1989).  Both  receptors  have been  found  in the 
respiratory tract of swine (Ito et al, 1998), providing solid 
molecular evidence for pigs as “mixing vessels” for human 
and avian influenza viruses.  Although these receptor types 
are also found in the respiratory tract of  quail (Wan and 
Perez, 2006) and in humans (Shinya et al, 2006), it should 
be noted that  pigs have been shown to transmit reassortant 
influenza viruses to humans (Olsen et al, 2006; Robinson 
et al, 2007; Swenson et al, 2008). Furthermore, humans 
can  also  transmit  influenza  viruses  to  pigs  as  will  be 
discussed in the following paragraph. Zoonotic infections 
are  not  a  one-way  only  event;  they  can  work  in  both 
directions. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. The pig as a “mixing vessel” for influenza A viruses.  
Wild aquatic birds are the natural reservoirs for influenza A virus 
subtypes H1-H16. Avian influenza A viruses are frequently 
transmitted to domestic fowl from the natural wild life reservoirs, 
and also to pigs from domestic fowl. Human and avian influenza 
A viruses can infect pigs and reassortment can occur in pigs 
between avian, swine and human influenza A viruses. Influenza 
A viruses from pigs can also infect humans. Pigs are postulated 
as the intermediate host, i.e., the “mixing vessel” for influenza A 
viruses. Avian influenza viruses from domestic fowl or wild 
aquatic birds occasionally transmit to humans (e.g., H5N1 virus). 
Solid lines; frequent and/or confirmed transmission events: 
Dotted lines; possible and/or occasional transmission events.  
 
 
Swine are susceptible to avian and human influenza A 
viruses 
Numerous  laboratories  have  isolated  wholly  AIVs  from 
swine. In addition, pigs have been experimentally infected 
with the H1-H13 subtypes of AIVs (Kida et al, 1994) and 
may  be  susceptible  to  H14-H16  subtypes  as  well.  An 
H1N1 AIV that was first detected in European swine in 
1979  is  still  circulating  in  European  swine  populations 
(Pensaert et al, 1981; Scholtissek et al, 1983). A different 
H1N1 AIV was found to have been transmitted to pigs in 
China in 1993 (Guan et al, 1996); H4N6, H3N3 and H1N1 
AIVs were isolated from Canadian pigs in 1999, 2001 and 
2002,  respectively  (Karasin  et  al,  2000;  Karasin  et  al, 
2004).  Ninomiya  and  colleagues  (2002)  provided 
serological evidence of infection in Asian pigs with H4, 
H5  or  H9  AIVs.  Recently,  an  H9N2  AIV  was  isolated 
from pigs in several provinces in China (Cong et al, 2008; 
Xu et al, 2004; Yu et al, 2008a), and a H5N1 HPAIV was 
identified  in  pigs  in  Asian  countries  (Zhu  et  al,  2008). 
These observations have led to the conclusion that swine 
can  serve  as  direct  and  intermediate  hosts  for  many 
subtypes of AIVs including the HPAIV of the H5 and H7 
subtypes.  However, there is recent evidence that domestic 
pigs show only low susceptibility to H5N1 HPAIV (Choi 
et al, 2005; Lipatov et al, 2008). 
 
The infection of pigs with wholly human viruses has also 
been  documented.    The  first  confirmed  case  of  human 
H3N2 influenza virus occurred in Taiwanese pigs in 1970 
(Kundin,  1970).  Over  time,  human  H3N2  viruses  were 
regularly isolated from pigs and subclinical human H3N2 
infections have been detected throughout the world. More 
recently,  human-like  H3N2  viruses  were  found  in  pigs 
from southern China (Yu et al, 2007). In addition, human 
H1N1 viruses have been discovered in swine populations 
world-wide and serological surveillance suggests that the 
prevailing human H1N1 viruses are readily transmitted to 
pigs  (Brown,  2000).  While  pig-to-pig  transmission  of 
human  H1N1  viruses  has  been  demonstrated  under 
experimental  conditions  (Kundin  and  Easterday,  1972), 
there are only a few reports of wholly human H1 viruses 
being isolated from swine (Katsuda et al, 1995; Nerome et 
al, 1982; Karasin et al, 2006; Yu et al, 2007). As required 
for  the  maintenance  and  intra-species  transmission  of 
AIVs  in  pigs,  efficient  transmission  of  human  viruses 
between pigs necessitates molecular adaptation to the new 
host (Lipatov et al, 2004). Swine susceptibility  to avian 
and  human  influenza  A  viruses  has  and  continues  to 
provide opportunities for the introduction of new influenza 
genes into swine influenza viruses within swine.  If a pig is 
co-infected with AIV and another disparate influenza virus 
strain  such  as  a  human/swine  virus,  a  triple  reassortant 
virus  (human/avian/swine)  can  easily  be  generated  and 
established as discussed in the next paragraph.  
pigs
Humans
Domestic fowl
Wild aquatic birds
pigs
Humans
Domestic fowl
Wild aquatic birds 
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Reassortment of swine/avian/human viruses occurs in 
the pig  
Genetic reassortment among avian, human and/or swine 
viruses has been documented in pigs. Peiris et al (2001) 
found that a H9N2 AIV and contemporary human H3N2 
influenza  viruses  were  co-circulating  in  pigs  in 
Southeastern  China,  creating  an  opportunity  for 
reassortment to occur. Indeed, double reassortant H3N2 
viruses containing human genes (HA and NA) and avian 
genes  (PB2,  PB1,  PA,  NP,  M  and  NS),  and  the  triple 
reassortant H3N2 viruses carrying human (HA and NA), 
swine gene (NP) and avian genes (PB2, PB1, PA, M and 
NS)  have  emerged  in  pigs  in  China (Yu  et  al,  2008b). 
Genetic reassortment in pigs allows for the generation of 
novel influenza viruses and further demonstrates that pigs 
can serve as intermediate hosts and therefore as “mixing 
vessels” for human, swine and avian influenza viruses. 
 
Before 1998 only classical H1N1 swine influenza viruses 
were isolated from the US pigs. Since 1998 the double 
(human/swine,  subtype  H3N2)  and  triple  (avian/swine/ 
human,  subtypes  H3N2,  H1N2,  H1N1  and  H3N1) 
reassortant swine influenza viruses have emerged in the 
United States and Canada. Presently, triple but not double 
reassortant  swine  influenza  viruses  have  spread  widely 
within  swine across  the US  and  Canadian  swine  herds. 
(Choi et al, 2002; Zhou et al, 1999; Karasin et al, 2006; 
Lekcharoensuk et al, 2006; Ma et al, 2006; Olsen et al, 
2006; Webby et al, 2004). These facts provide compelling 
evidence that pigs could serve as a “mixing vessel” for 
influenza A viruses.   
 
The double reassortant H3N2 virus was first isolated from 
pigs  with  a  severe  influenza-like  illness  on  a  farm  in 
North  Carolina  in  1998.  Genetic  analysis  of  this  virus 
showed that the isolate contained gene segments similar 
to those of the classical-swine lineage (NS, NP, M, PB2 
and PA) and a recent human influenza virus (HA, NA and 
PB1)  (Zhou  et  al,  1999).  Subsequent  triple  reassortant 
H3N2 viruses isolated from pigs in Minnesota, Iowa and 
Texas contained gene segments from the classical swine 
virus (NS, NP and M), a recent human virus (HA, NA and 
PB1) and an avian virus (PB2 and PA) (Zhou et al, 1999). 
Subsequently, the triple reassortant H3N2 viruses evolved 
through genetic drift and reassorted with classical H1N1 
swine viruses to produce novel reassortant H1N2, H1N1 
and  H3N1  viruses.  The  triple  reassortant  H3N2,  H1N2 
and  H1N1  viruses  are  the  predominant  subtypes 
circulating  in  the  US  swine  population,  whereas  the 
double reassortant H3N2 viruses did not spread efficiently 
among swine. 
 
One commonality among all of these novel reassortants is 
the maintenance of specific molecularly defined internal 
genes  representing  the  PB1,  PB2,  PA,  NP,  M  and  NS 
gene  segment,  the  so-called  triple  reassortant  internal 
gene  (TRIG)  cassette,  derived  from  the  original  triple 
reassortant  H3N2  virus.  Since  2005,  introductions  of 
human-like  H1  viruses  that  are  genetically  and 
antigenically distinct from the classical swine H1 lineage 
were identified in  pigs in  Canada (Karasin  et al,  2006) 
and  have  spread  across  the  U.S.  swine  herds  (Gramer, 
2008).  The  six  internal  genes  of  these  human-like  H1 
viruses appear to be similar to those found in the TRIG 
cassette of contemporary swine triple reassortant viruses. 
This  would  suggest  that  the  TRIG  cassette  can  accept 
multiple HA and NA types and may endow a selective 
advantage to swine viruses possessing them. 
 
Surprisingly,  triple  reassortant  H2N3  influenza  viruses 
with leucine at position 226 and glycine at position 228 of 
HA, similar to  early  isolates  of  the 1957  H2N2 human 
pandemic, were isolated  in  2006 from pigs  in  Missouri 
(Ma  et  al,  2007).  The  novel  swine  H2N3  viruses  were 
able  to  cause  disease  in  swine  and  mice,  and  were 
infectious  and  highly  transmissible  between  swine  and 
ferrets without prior adaptation. More importantly, if able 
to transmit to humans, H2 influenza viruses would pose a 
substantial  risk  because  they  have  been  absent  from 
mammalian species since 1968 (Krauss et al, 2004; Liu et 
al, 2004; Munster et al, 2007), and people born after 1968 
have little pre-existing immunity to the subtype. 
 
Pigs transmit influenza viruses to humans 
The  transmission  of  swine  influenza  viruses  to  humans 
has  been  well  documented.  Castrucci  et  al  (1993)  and 
Brown  et  al  (1998)  demonstrated  genetic  reassortment 
between  avian  H1N1  and  human  H3N2  viruses  in  the 
European  pigs  in  1993  and  1998,  respectively.  The 
resulting double (avian/human) reassortant H3N2 viruses, 
with mammalian HA and NA surface glycoproteins and 
avian  internal  genes,  transmitted  to  children  in  the 
Netherlands.  Similar  reassortant  H3N2  viruses  were 
subsequently  isolated  from  humans  in  Hong  Kong 
(Gregory  et  al,  2001),  demonstrating  the  potential  of 
viruses reassorted in swine to spread within mammalian 
populations. Also, Myers et al (2007) reported 50 cases of 
zoonotic swine influenza virus infections. While a few of 
these zoonotic swine influenza virus isolates were of the 
H3N2 subtype, the majority were of the H1N1 subtype. 
The case-fatality rate for zoonotic swine influenza virus 
infections  in  humans  was  14%  and  the  median  age  of 
patients was 24.5 years old (Myers et al, 2007). Although 
human  swine  influenza  virus  infections  without  direct 
swine  contact  are  possible,  most  patients  (61%)  with 
zoonotic  swine  influenza  infections  reported  a  recent 
exposure to pigs. Farmers, meat processing workers and 
veterinarians  were  found  to  have  significantly  elevated 
serologic titers against H1N1 and H1N2 swine influenza 
viruses compared to control subjects (Myers et al, 2006; 
Gray  et  al,  2007).  Thus,  occupational  exposure  to  pigs 
may play an important role in the “mixing vessel” theory. 
 
The  transmission  of  influenza  viruses  from  swine  to 
humans is not a rare event.  An H3N2 swine influenza 
virus containing the TRIG cassette was isolated from a 7-
month-old boy in Canada (Robinson et al, 2007). As the 
infant had no history  of contact with farm animals, the 
virus  is  believed  to  have  transmitted  from  human-to-
human. In another zoonotic transmission event, an H1N1 
swine  influenza  virus,  also  carrying  the  TRIG  cassette, 
was found to be responsible for acute respiratory illnesses 
in healthy pigs and humans at a 2007 Ohio county fair 
(Swenson  et  al,  2008).  H1N1  viruses  isolated  from  the 
sick individuals were genetically 100% identical to those 
harbored by the pigs, indicating that the virus was passed  
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between pigs and humans at the fair. In an experimental 
swine infection  model, the Ohio  H1N1  swine influenza 
virus was shed at high titers and caused severe clinical 
disease in pigs (Vincent et al, 2008). Subsequently to this 
case, almost identical H1N1 swine influenza viruses were 
isolated from swine in several states, showing the ability 
of the virus to spread easily within susceptible pigs. Case 
reports indicate at least a 10% mortality rate with these 
novel  Ohio-like  H1N1  in  finishing  pigs  (S  Henry, 
personal communication), but figures for related human 
illnesses are unknown. 
 
There  is  no  direct  evidence  that  reassortment  events 
leading to previous pandemic viruses (such as those of the 
1918,  1957  or  1968  pandemics)  occurred  in  pigs. 
However, reassortment of avian, human and swine viruses 
in  the  pig  and  subsequent  molecular  adaptation  of  the 
reassortant swine influenza viruses have been described. 
These  could  result  in  infection  of  humans  with  swine-
derived reassortant viruses harboring the ability to cause 
human-to-human transmission. 
 
Unifying human and veterinary research and medicine     
HPAIV,  e.g.,    H5N1  or  H7N7  viruses,  or  other  novel 
influenza viruses generated in mixing vessels (e.g. swine 
and quail) or transmitted directly from birds to humans 
clearly pose a serious threat of causing the next human 
influenza pandemic. However, it is not possible to predict 
which  virus  will  be responsible  for  the  next  pandemic. 
Some  scientists  suggest  that  the  danger  of  a  sudden 
appearance  of  a  wholly  avian  influenza  virus  with 
pandemic potential is most likely overestimated (Normile, 
2005).  However,  this  is  not  the  prevailing  scientific 
opinion. A recent editorial in Nature argued that “as long 
as H5N1 continues to be present in animals, that risk [of a 
pandemic]  persists. And with so  many  other flu strains 
out in the world, all constantly evolving, a flu pandemic is 
inevitable” (Editorial, Nature, 2008). 
 
The crux is that when a human influenza pandemic does 
begin, it will emerge in a non-linear fashion that will be 
difficult to contain (Wolf et al, 2006; Landolt and Olsen, 
2007;  Takeuchi  and  Hogeweg,  2008;  Bull  and  Ebert, 
2008).  The  Writing  Committee  of  the  Second  WHO 
Consultation on Clinical Aspects of Human Infection with 
H5N1  AIV  (2008)  recently  acknowledged  that  H5N1 
viruses “are entrenched among poultry in parts of Asia, 
Africa,  and  perhaps  the  Middle  East”  and  that  H5N1 
viruses “among birds continues to cause human disease 
with high mortality and to pose the threat of a pandemic”. 
On the important question of how the H5N1 viruses infect 
the  human  respiratory  tract,  the  Writing  Committee 
simply notes that “the exact mode and sites of influenza A 
(H5N1)  virus  acquisition  in  the  respiratory  tract  [of 
humans] are incompletely understood” (2008). However, 
it should be noted that recent studies have found that the 
receptors preferentially binding AIVs are located in the 
lower portions of the human respiratory system (Shinya et 
al, 2006; Gambotto et al, 2008), explaining how AIVs can 
directly  infect  humans  and  also  why  human-to-human 
transmission with non-adapted AIVs is rather limited. If 
changes were to occur in virus receptor binding affinity of 
AIVs that permitted replication of AIVs also in the upper 
human respiratory  system, this would result in efficient 
human-to-human  transmission  and  the  possibility  of  a 
pandemic (Normile, 2006; Shinya et al, 2006; van Riel, 
2006).  It  is  precisely  because  both  avian  and  human 
influenza  A  viruses  have  the  ability  to  replicate 
effectively in the respiratory tracts of swine that pigs are a 
“mixing vessel” and pose a high probability of being the 
source of a pandemic. 
 
Based on history, influenza is and will continue to be a 
serious  threat  to  the  health  of  many  species  including 
humans.  Therefore,  in  both  human  and  veterinary 
research, more attention needs to be given to the cross-
species  transmission  capacity  of  influenza  A  viruses 
(Osterhaus, 2001; Kuiken et al, 2006; Landolt and Olsen, 
2007;  Bewley,  2008;  Chandrasekaran  et  al,  2008), 
especially  on  sources  such  as  swine  and  farmed  quail 
(Wan  and  Perez,  2006).    Interdisciplinary  research  and 
communication  between  veterinary  and  public  health 
professionals is essential in order to evaluate the precise 
danger  points  that  could  lead  to  the  next  influenza 
pandemic. Even though pigs can generate novel influenza 
viruses  capable  of  infecting  humans,  at  present  it  is 
difficult to predict which particular virus will cause the 
next human influenza pandemic. The index case (“patient 
zero”) probably linking a wild bird, chicken or domestic 
duck with a pig and/or a person could be anywhere in the 
world, but a Southeast Asian “wet market” is most likely 
to  be  the  locale  in  which  the  next  pandemic  virus  is 
generated.  However,  recent  events  resulting  in  the 
establishment and isolation of a reassorted, mammalian-
adapted H2N3 viruses from pigs in the US should remind 
scientists, medical doctors, veterinarians and farmers that 
the creation of novel reassortant swine influenza viruses 
with zoonotic and pandemic potential could also happen 
in  modern  swine  facilities  in  the  backyard  of  a  highly 
industrialized  country  in  North  America  or  Western 
Europe. 
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